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Contents v
Tables x
Maps and Figures xi
Abbreviations xiii
PREFACE xv
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER ONE
The Kingdom of Hormuz
Institutions, Territory and Trade (1500-1622) 7
Town and Island 9
Population 15
Water and Food Supplies 19
Social Life 24
Religious Life 26
The Territory of the Kingdom of Hormuz. 30
Islands and the Southern Littoral of the Persian Gulf: 30; Northern Littoral
of the Persian Gulf: 32; Southern Littoral of the Gulf of Oman: 33
How Hormuz Enforced Its Commercial Supremacy 39
The Trouble With Pirates 43
Administration of the Kingdom of Hormuz 46
Administrative Structure of Portuguese Hormuz 50
The Trade of Hormuz 58
Products: 59; Direction of Trade: 61; Volume of Trade: 63; The Merchants:
64
Customs Duties and Revenues 66
How Portuguese Hormuz Fared 74
CHAPTER TWO
The Kingdom of Hormuz
From the Arrival of the Portuguese to the Ottoman Challenge (1507-1550)
Introduction 89
The Conquest of Hormuz (1507-1508) 91
Portuguese Absence from Hormuz (1508-1515) 97
Imposition of Portuguese Rule over Hormuz (1515) 101
Lemos Embassy to Esma`il I (1515) 104
The Revolt of 1521 and the Death of Turan Shah IV 106
Soltan Mohammad Shah II (r. 1521-1534) 112
Negotiations with the Portuguese (1522-1523): 112; New Treaty with
Portugal (1523): 114; Old Problems Cause New Trouble (1525-1527): 116;
Exile of Sharaf al-Din, the Vizier (1527-1529): 118; The Bahrain
Debacle (1529): 124; First Omani Vizierate (1529-1534): 125
Mozaffar al-Din Salghur Shah II (r. 1534-1543) 127
Second Omani Vizierate (1534-1540): 127; Siege of Reyshahr (1539): 128;
Exile of Salghur Shah II (1541-1543): 131
Fakhr al-Din Turan Shah V (r. 1543-1564) 133
Cession of the Hormuz Customs-House to Portugal: 133; Safavid Challenge
of Hormuz in Moghestan (1542-1545): 133; The Return of the Viziers
from Fal (1540): 135
CHAPTER THREE
Basra, The Other Emporium in the Persian Gulf (1500-1612)
Accessibility 139
Town and Population 142
The Economy 143
Customs Duties and Revenues 148
Transportation Cost and Routes 150
Rule of the Montafeq Emirs (1515-1546) 153
Early Contacts with the Portuguese: 153; Acknowledgement of Ottoman
Suzerainty (1534): 156; The Ottoman Conquest of Basra (1546): 157
Rule of Ottoman Pashas (1547-1612) 163
Immediate Changes: 163; Peaceful Gestures Towards Portugal (1547): 165
Ottomans and Portuguese Face Off (1550-1559) 170
Earlier Encounters: 170; The Battle for Hormuz (1552): 173;
The Battle for Bahrain (1559): 178; Unofficial Truce (1563-1622): 179
Marsh Arabs Challenge Ottoman Rule (1547-1612) 182
Arab Tribes Rule the Hinterland: 182; Hoveyzeh Joins the Fray (1580): 186;
Sayyed Mobarak Asks Portugal for Help: 187
CHAPTER FOUR
The Kingdom of Hormuz and the Conflict with Safavid Persia (1550-1621)
Soltan Mohammad Shah III (r. 1565) and Farrokh Shah I (r. 1565-1602) 191
Weakening Role of the Kings of Hormuz: 191;
Growing Roman Catholic Militancy: 193
New Diplomatic Contacts with Europe 194
Introduction: 194; Miguel d’Abreu de Lima Mission (1572): 196;
Simon de Moraes Mission (1582): 197; Giovanni Battista Vechietti
Mission (1586): 198; `Abbas I Changes the Playing Field: 199;
Nicolau de Melo Mission – Sherley Brothers (1598): 201
The Conquest of Bahrain (1602) 202
Incorporation of the Moghestan and Birunat Districts 203
Turan Shah VI (r. ?-1597), Farrokh Shah II (r. 1597-1602)and Firuz Shah (r.
1602-1609) 205
Dynastic Troubles: 205
The Lacerda Embassy (1604) 207
Redirection of the Silk Trade Discussed (1607-1610) 209
Dengis Beg-Gouvea Embassy (1609): 210
The Conquest of Bandel de Camorão
and the Establishment of Bandar `Abbasi (1614) 215
Mohammad Shah IV - The last king of Hormuz (r. 1609-1621) 217
Continued Dynastic Troubles: 217; Royal Politicking: 219
From the Conquest of Bandel de Camorão to the Fall of Hormuz (1614-1621) 220
Sherley Embassy to Spain (1615): 220; De Silva y Figueroa
Embassy (1614-1619): 221; Sohar Destroyed by the Portuguese (1616): 224;
Arrival and Actions of Rui Freire d’Andrade (1619-1621): 226;
Qeshm Debacle and Fall of Hormuz (1621): 228
Conclusion 230
CHAPTER FIVE
Bandar `Abbas: Maritime Gateway to Safavid Persia
Introduction 237
Why Bandar `Abbas and Not an Alternative Port? 238
Early History of Bandar `Abbas Prior to 1622 247
Development of Bandar `Abbas after 1622 250
Population: 250; Buildings: 253; Town Defenses: 260; Food and Water Supply:
263;
Health: 265; Social Life: 267; Religious Life: 270
The Political Administration of Bandar `Abbas 272
The Main Local Officials: 272; The Role of the Governor or Soltan: 273;
The Role of the Customs Master or Shahbandar: 276
Changing Patterns in Local Political Power 281
Growing Power of the `Evaz Beg Family of Lar (1640) 282
The Mohammad Beg Family Intermezzo (1651-1660) 284
Diversion of Trade from Bandar `Abbas to Other Persian Gulf Ports 288
Farming of the Customs Revenues of the Persian Gulf Ports 290
Other Reasons for the Primary Role of Bandar `Abbas 293
Governor of Lar Controls the Persian Gulf Ports 296
Relations between Merchants and Safavid Authorities 304
The Annual Presents 306
Naser `Ali Khan – A Troublesome Governor 309
The East India Company’s Problems 312
The Use of Force – A Limited Option 315
A Balanced Relationship 319
Conclusion 320
CHAPTER SIX
From Portuguese to Ya`ariba Masqat (1622-1725)
Introduction 323
Portuguese Reign of Terror in the Persian Gulf (1622-1632) 325
Masqat under Portuguese Rule (1622-1649) 335
The Town of Masqat: 335; Other Omani Coastal Settlements;
Under Portuguese Control: 337; Qoryat: 338; Matrah: 338; Sib: 338;
Barkah: 339; Sohar: 339; Kalbah: 340; Khur Fakkan: 340; Madha: 340;
Bidya: 341; Diba: 341
Masqat Trade until 1650 342
Last Portuguese Stand at Masqat 351
Ya`ariba Masqat (1650-1725) 355
Masqat Town 355
Population: 355; Buildings and Walls: 356; Religion: 357;
Food Supplies: 359; Trades and Crafts: 360
System of Government 361
International Trade in Masqat 364
Development of Masqat as a Port-of-Call 369
Beginning of Portuguese Attacks (1652) 371
English Interest in Masqat (1659) 375
Safavids request Dutch Support to Invade Masqat (1664) 378
New Round of Hostilities with Portugal (1666-1674) 383
The Dutch Establish a Factory at Masqat (1672-1675) 386
Portuguese-Omani Truce (1672) 395
Why the Dutch Withdrew from Masqat (1675) 398
A Change of Policy in Masqat 407
Safavids Want an Anti-Omani Alliance (1695-1719) 409
Oman Attacks and Conquers Bahrain (1717) 418
Conclusion 425
CHAPTER SEVEN
Bandar-e Kong, the last Portuguese toehold in the Persian Gulf (1630-1721)
Safavid-Portuguese Agreement Concerning Bandar-e Kong 429
The Town of Bandar-e Kong 436
Organization of the Safavid Administration 439
Organization of the Portuguese at Bandar-e Kong 441
The Trade of Bandar-e Kong 441
Early Problems of Bandar-e Kong 443
Commercial Take-Off 448
Development of Relations with the Portuguese 453
Conclusion 476
CHAPTER EIGHT
Basra under Afrasiyab Emirs and Ottoman Pashas (1600-1730)
Introduction 479
The Province of Basra 479
Administration of the Basra Emirate 481
Basra Town 492
Accessibility: 492; Population: 496; Houses and Walls: 501;
Climate and Public Health: 502
Basrene Economy 504
Agriculture: 505; Pilgrimage Trade: 506; International Trade: 507;
The Merchants: 509; Externalities: 513
Exports 514
Pearls: 514; Specie: 514; Horses: 517
Regional Trade 517
Customs Rates 520
Weights and Measures: 525
Trade Under the Afrasiyabs (1612-1669) 526
Trade under Ottoman Rule (1669-1730) 534
The Rule of the Afrasiyab Emirs 545
Afrasiyab Pasha (1612-1624): 545
`Ali Pasha (1624-50) 548
Hoseyn Pasha (1650-1668) 554
A Family Squabble (1652): 556; The First Ottoman Attack on Basra (1654):
557;
The Fall of Basra: 559; The Ottomans Retreat (1654): 561; The Second Ottoman
Attack on Basra (1666): 562; The Third Ottoman Attack on Basra (1669): 566
Yahya Pasha (1668-69) 570
The Rule of Ottoman Pashas (1670-1730) 573
Twenty Years of Normality (1670-1690) 574
The Montafeq Flex their Muscles (1691-1696) 575
Safavid Interlude (1696-1701) 578
Restoration of Ottoman Rule (1701) 584
Period of Relative Normalcy (1715-1730) 591
Discussion: 597
AFTERWORD 599
TABLES OF RULERS AND GOVERNORS 605
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books and Articles 613
Index 631
PREFACE
Since the publication of Arnold Wilson’s The Persian Gulf in 1930 a
large number of books have been published about the history of the Persian
Gulf, but very few about the period that this book deals with, i.e. the Safavid
era or the period between 1500 and 1730—this despite the fact that
it was during this period that intense regular contact between Europe and
this region began. Books of a more comprehensive nature that offer a general
overview of this region during this period are dated or do not add much new
information to the existing knowledge. I will only mention a few of the most
recent ones. The book by N.N. Tumanovich, Evropeiskie derzhaby v Persisdskom
Zalive v 16-19 vv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), for example, only has some 20 pages
on this period and has nothing of interest to offer. The book by R.J. Barendse,
The Arabian Seas. The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century (Armonk/London,
2002) is a step in the right direction, because he introduces the right orientation
of how the Persian Gulf area should be perceived. However, despite his comprehensive
approach, his discussion of events in the Persian Gulf ports is very flawed
and uneven so that his analysis is faulty and leaves much to be desired.
The book by Mohammad Baqer Vothuqi, Tarikh-e Mohajerat-e Aqvam dar Khalij-e
Fars (Moluk-e Hormuz) (Tehran, 1380/2001) is a great improvement on what
literature existed earlier on the Persian Gulf in Persian, but his analysis
is flawed by his playing up of the importance of the Persian Gulf in Safavid
politics and the qualification of the Portuguese as imperialists. Moreover,
he mostly relies on a limited number of primary sources for the Safavid period,
although for the preceding period he has made ample use of Persian and Arabic
sources, some of them unpublished still in manuscript. For the Safavid period,
however, he has neither used Dutch nor the major Portuguese sources or the
published EIC records and thus, per force, his discussion is not comprehensive,
because he had no access to the rich archival sources of the three major
European powers during that era. The same criticism applies to the recently
published dissertation by Gholam Hoseyn Nezami. Naqsh-e Basrah va Banader-e
Keranehha-ye Shomali-ye Khalij-e Fars dar Ravabet-e Iran va `Othmani (1049-1263H.Q./1639-1847
C.E.) (Bushire, 1383/2004). Both books are, however, a considerable improvement
on what literature existed up till then, for they bring much new information
to the attention of the reader of Persian. The situation is not so positive
in Arabic. There is a large number of articles in Arabic, which mainly are
uncritical summaries of studies done by others, while their claim to scholarship
is based on putting the Portuguese and other Europeans in the role of imperialist
villains. Of the very few monographs in Arabic that exist on this period
and area I only want to mention two. One is the Kitab al-tanafus al-dawli
fi Khalij al-`Arabi 1622-1763 (Beirut, 1981) by Mustafa `Uqayl al-Khatib.
The author ascribes a major role to Arabs in the developments of the Persian
Gulf (such as the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormuz), makes many and
serious mistakes in referring to Safavid Persian personages and geographical
names, and his account is full of historical errors. It therefore is not
a book that one would recommend. The other book is `Arab al-Khalij, 1602-1784:
fi daw’ masadir Sharikat al-Hind al-Sharqiyah al-Hulandiyah (Abu Dhabi,
1995) by Ben J. Slot, which is an exception to this general assessment, because
he has brought together much new information, which one may expect from an
archivist of the Dutch National Archives. The draw-back of this book, however,
is that its focus is on Arabs and Arabia, thus explicitly ignoring the nature
of the Persian Gulf as one cultural and commercial area, but then one cannot
have everything. Also, it mainly uses Dutch archival material and its subject
matter is therefore limited to the 17th and 18th century. Unfortunately,
this book is hard to find and although originally written in English only
the Arabic version seems to be available in some libraries; at least I have
not been able to get hold of the original English version. However, all these
books, whatever their shortcomings, have at least tried to bring the history
of this region to the attention of the readers and hopefully have generated
more interest in it.
Fortunately, quite a number of studies, mostly articles, have been published
that deal with one or more particular aspect or historical period of the
Persian Gulf during the Safavid period. First and foremost, Jean Aubin’s
works about the kingdom of Hormuz in particular and about its Safavid Persian
hinterland and the Indian Ocean linkages in general have been very important
to make new material available and to provide new insights. Also, he has
been instrumental in making scholars understand that you have to think
larger than your own area, for the Persian Gulf region was a part of the
Indian Ocean and the Middle-Eastern political and trading network. In particular,
and not only through his involvement in the publication of the journals
Mare Luso-Indicum and Moyen-Orient and Océan-Indien, but also by
the methodology used in his studies he has been a leading light and guide
for other scholars. In fact, Chapter One of this study on the Kingdom of
Hormuz is partly a summary of his study on the subject matter (Aubin, Jean. “Le
royaume d’Ormuz au début du XVIe siècle,” Mare
Luso-Indicum II (1973) pp. 77-179). I only have made changes where I thought
correction was needed or where I have found additional new information.
Other authors who have made important contributions include (I cannot mention
everybody, although everybody, I hope, has been quoted in the footnotes
to this book and in its bibliography) Salih Özbaran, who has focused
on Ottoman-Portuguese relations in the Persian Gulf, making use not only
of Ottoman texts, but also of Portuguese documents. Jahangir Qa’em-Maqami
has contributed to our knowledge by making available many original texts
in Persian, Arabic or Turkish from Portuguese archives, mostly facsimiles
and their printed texts from the correspondence between the Hormuz kings
and his officials with the kings of Portugal. His study is more important
for the documents that he has made available than his analysis of this
period, which stands in need of much correction. In addition, apart from
my own studies concerning this area, there are two studies that shed light
on the role of the Dutch and English during the 17th century and as such
provide important information and analysis pertaining to this period. These
two studies are the unpublished dissertation British-Persian Relations
in the 17th Century by the late R.W. Ferrier and the book Politics and
Trade by Rudy Matthee. Of particular interest are two dissertations, each
of which has made an important contribution to our understanding of the
events of this period, although they are unfortunately known to only a
few scholars because of their unpublished status. They are Trade in the
Safavid Port City Bandar Abbas and the Persian Gulf Area (ca. 1600-1680).
A Study of Selected Aspects (School of Oriental and African Studies, 1993/94)
by Rüdiger Klein and Economia de um império. Economia política
do Estado da Índia em torno do mar Arábico e golfo Pérsico.
Elementos conjuncturais: 1595-1635 (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1995)
by João Manuel de Almeida Teles e Cunha. Last, but most certainly
not least, I would like to mention the unsung heroes of history to whom
we all owe gratitude, in this case the editors of Dutch (e.g. Coolhaas,
Dunlop, Hotz), English (e.g., Foster), Spanish (Alonso, Gil, Baião)
and Portuguese archival sources (e.g., Bulhão Pato, Fellner, Rego,
Sá, Schurhammer, Wicki, Baião, Cordeiro, etc.) without whose
endeavors my work and that of others would have been so much more difficult,
if not impossible.
What I emphasize in this study is that whatever happened in the Persian Gulf
was partly the result of endogenous events, partly of extraneous events.
For, first and foremost the Persian Gulf was an integral part of the Indian
Ocean, and we cannot study or understand what happened in the Persian Gulf
without understanding or taking into account what happened in Asia and
even Europe. For example, the way the European companies behaved was often
determined by larger concerns about their position within Asia and Europe,
which often impelled or cramped their style. Regionally, the interest shown
by the large land-based empires was greatly influenced by their involvement
in regional conflicts as well as by fiscal concerns. Locally, the persistence
of the importance and influence of local interest groups (tribes, clans)
acted as an impediment and/or instrument for central governments and had
major influence on socio-economic and political life in the respective
ports. Nevertheless, the emphasis in this study is on what happened in
the Persian Gulf itself and in particular in the five ports that are the
subject of this study.
In chapter one I provide an overview of the social, religious and economic
dimension of the kingdom of Hormuz, and furthermore, how the kingdom functioned
and what its revenues were, and how and to what extent the Portuguese Crown
benefited from its vassal kingdom. In chapter two an analysis is given
as to how the relationship between the Hormuz kingdom and the Portuguese
state developed between 1507-1550 and what consequences this had for both
sides. In chapter three the social, economic and political situation and
development of Basra is analyzed. Basra was not only the main Western outlet
for Indian trade in the Persian Gulf; it also became the launching pad
for the Ottoman challenge to Portuguese control over the Gulf. Basra finally
became too heavy a burden for the Ottomans, who, despite several pacification
campaigns, were unable to create a modus vivendi with the Marsh Arabs and
therefore had to abandon the province. In chapter four I discuss the demise
of the authority of the kings of Hormuz, who had become mere figureheads
by the 1540s. Furthermore, the Hormuz kingdom became the transit station
for Portuguese diplomats in their endeavor to hitch the subsequent shahs
of Safavid Persia to their anti-Ottoman wagon. Ironically the auxiliary
weapon to attack the Ottomans in the back turned against the Portuguese,
when these were unable to offer realistic and concrete support to Shah
`Abbas I, resulting in the fall of Hormuz in 1622. In chapter five I discuss
the social dimension of life in Bandar `Abbas as well as the morphology
of the town. Furthermore, I give an analysis of the importance of the two
main officials in that port (the governor and shahbandar) and how they
functioned locally and in relation to foreign merchants. Most importantly,
the important role played by one family from Lar in controlling the littoral
and its hinterland is highlighted. Chapter six does the same for Masqat,
but focuses on Portuguese attempts to make the port a thriving entrepot
as well as on its transformation into a major port for the Ya`ariba state.
Furthermore, I examine how relations between expanding Ya`ariba Oman and
its neighbors (maritime and otherwise) developed. Chapter seven offers
an insight into how Bandar-e Kong developed from a fishing village into
an important port and how the Portuguese failed to make it a Portuguese
emporium. However, the port developed into the Estado’s most important
cash-cow, providing much-needed cash to a financially strapped Goa. In
the eighth and last chapter the focus is on Basra, both where its commercial
and political developments are concerned and on the administrative and
urban structure of the autonomous province under the Afrasiyab emirs and
the Ottomans, who repossessed the province in 1669. Although the Ottomans
were once again in charge they had not learnt their previous lesson and
were unable to come to a working relationship with the Marsh Arabs, resulting
in a very uneasy rule.
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